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This paper makes contributions to two areas of investigation within the
context of the household production function approach to consumer behavior
(Becker 1965; Michael and Decker 1973): the estimation of health production
functions and the economics of fertility control. In the former area we
present the first infant health production functions that simultaneously
control for self—selection (correlations between unobserved variables and
observed outcomes) in the resolution of pregnancies as live births or
induced abortions and in the use of prenatal medical care services. In the
latter area we incorporate the decision of a pregnant woman to give birth
or obtain an abortion into economic models of fertility control and use
information conveyed by this decision to refine estimates of infant health
production functions and demand functions for prenatal medical care.
The concept of a health production function, originally developed by
Grossman (1972), has been widely accepted and fruitfully applied. Yet,
until recently, researchers have tended to emphasize reduced form as
opposed to structural estimates. The reasoning was clear. Unobserved
biological factors such as an individual's exogenous health endowment and
hard-to—measure endogenous inputs such as nutrition, exercise, and the
avoidance of stress can play major roles in the determination of health
outcomes.If an individual's behavior is shaped in part by knowledge of
his or her endowment or if the unmeasured endogenous inputs are correlated
with the included inputs, then estimates of the health technology will be
biased.
Recent work on the economic analysis of infant health (measured by—2—
birthweight or survival) by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982, 1963a, 1983b,
forthcoming a, forthcoming b); Corman, Joyce, and Grossman (1997); and
Joyce (1967) has emphasi2ed structural estimates of the health technology.
In these studies two—stage least squares has been applied to control for
the adverse selection of health inputs. In particular, Rosenzweig and
Schultz have argued that women who anticipate a problematic birth based on
conditions unknown to the researcher seek out more remedial care while
women with positive expectations seek out less. Consequently, the asso-
ciation between such variables as early prenatal medical care and birth—
weight is understated when measured by direct correlation measures.
Adverse selection in input use is, however, only one source of bias.
In the epidemiological literature researchers have argued that favorable
selection may be a more serious source of confounding (Gortmaker 1979;
Institute of Medicine 1965). The efficacy of prenatal care, for example,
may be seriously overstated if early care is but one form of healthy beha-
vior. Pregnant women who initiate care promptly may eat more nutritiously,
suffer less stress, engage in the appropriate exercise, and use less drugs
and other potentially harmful substances than women who begin care late.
The omission of these hard—to-measure inputs tends to overestimate the
impact of early prenatal care on birthweight.
Moreover, the resolution of a pregnancy itself may be characterized by
self—selection. With regard to this outcome, selection is favorable if
women whose fetuses have poor health endowments are more likely to obtain
an abortion or if women who desire to make relatively large investments in
their infants are more likely to give birth. On the other hand, selection—3—
is adverse if women who make relatively small investments are more likely
to give birth.
The use of an instrumental variable approach to correct for self—
selection in input use presupposes that this decision is characterized by
adverse selection1 and ignores the problem of self—selection in the resolu-
tion of pregnancies. In this paper we approach the problem differently and
somewhat more generally. Following Heckman (1979), we treat the estimation
of infant health production functions and prenatal medical care demand
functions as a general problem in self-selection. Specifically, we test
whether women who give birth represent a random draw from the population of
women who become pregnant. The widespread use of induced abortion since
its legalization by the Supreme Court in 1973 has permitted much greater
choice in the number and timing of births. In the United States in 1983.
30 percent of all pregnancies (live births plus induced abortions) were
terminated by induced abortions (Bureau of the Census 1986). Thus, the
extent to which a failure to incorporate the choice-based nature of micro
vital records into estimates of infant health production functions may bias
the parameters of this function is potentially large. It is our specific
hypothesis that the unobserved factors that impact on the decision to give
birth not only affect pregnancy outcomes but also condition the behavior of
women who choose to give birth during pregnancy as well.
Our study is based on a cohort of pregnant women in New York City in
1984. In that year 45 percent of all pregnancies to New York City residents
ended in induced abortions. We estimate a three equation model. The first
equation is the probability of giving birth, given that a woman is pregnant.—4-
With this as our criteria equation, we test for self—selection in the infant
health (measured by birthweight) production function and in the prenatal medi-
cal care demand function. Empirically, our estimates differ from those
obtained by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982, 1983b, forthcoming a, forthcoming b)
because they use micro vital records on live births alone. Not only does our
methodology obviate the need to assert a priori whether adverse or favorable
selection is dominant, but the sign pattern of the residual covariances indica-
tes which type of selection characterizes both the decision to give birth and
the decision to initiate prenatal care promptly.
Since our framework includes an implicit equation for the probability
of becoming pregnant, we incorporate induced abortion as an alternative to
traditional methods of contraception into economic models of fertility
control (for example. Michael and Willis 1975; Heckman and Willis 1975;
Hotz and Miller 1988).2 These models emphasize the use of contraception to
reduce the uncertainty associated with the number and timing of births.
Induced abortion eliminates much of this uncertainty at a positive price.
By assuming that the prices of contraception and abortion have unmeasured
components that vary among women, we enrich the theoretical literature on
the optimal number and quality of children (for example. Becker and Lewis
1973; Willis 1973) and gain a better understanding of the earliest indica-
tor of child quality -—infanthealth -—andthe resources allocated to its
production. In particular, we show that the prices of contraception and
abortion, as well as the health endowment of the fetus, simultaneously
influence decisions with regard to pregnancy resolutions and input selec-
tion.—5-
I. Analytical Framework
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982, 1983a, 1983b, forthcoming a, forthcoming
b); Corman and Grossman (1985); Corman, Joyce. and Grossman (1987); and.
Joyce (1987) have generated and estimated birth outcome production func-
tions and input and output demand functions for infant health in the con-
text of a static economic model of the family and household production. It
is assumed that the parents' utility function (or the mother's utility
function in families with no father) depends on their own consumption, the
number of births, and the survival probability of each birth (which does
not vary among births in a given family). The last variable is governed to
a large extent by birthweight. Both the number of births and the outcome
of each birth are endogenous variables. In particular, the birthweight
production function depends upon endogenous inputs including the quantity
and quality of medical care, the own time of the mother, and such healthy
behaviors as proper diet, appropriate exercise, and the avoidance of
stress. In addition, the production function is affected by the reproduc-
tive efficiency of the mother, including the unobserved biologically
endowed probability that her infant will survive the first month of life,
and other aspects of her efficiency in household production.
Maximization of the utility function subject to production and resource
constraints generates a demand function for birthweight in which this out-
come is related to input prices (whose indirect cost components are negati-
vely related to input availability), efficiency, income, and tastes. The
interaction between the birthweight demand and production functions deter-
mines demand functions for prenatal care and other endogenous inputs. These—6-
demand functions depend on the same set of variables as the demand function
for birthweight.
To introduce the decision of a pregnant woman to give birth or obtain
an abortion into the above model, note that a dynamic version of it implies
an optimal number of children for the 1th woman in year t(Ct). If C is
the actual number of children that a pregnant woman will have inyear t in
the absence of an abortion (parity plus one), then she will give birth
provided 1Tt= C'— 0 and will abort provided lritc .
Equationsfor the probability of a birth (it1), the production function
of birthweight (b1), and the demand for prenatal medical care(mi) now can
be specified. For convenience, the time subscripts and the interceptsare
suppressed. The birth probability function is assumed to be linear,
although later a probit specification will be used. The three equations are
Jr= aiz÷ u1. u1 =a2c1+a3a+ a4e1 (1)
b= 1x.+ $2m.+ u21, u2. =$3q.+$4e (2)
m1= u3u3 =Y2c+v3aF y4e1. (3)
In this system of equations, z1 x, vi. ci, a, and e1, denoteexoge-
nous variables or vectors of variables. For instance, in the birth proba-
bility equation (14. z stands for such determinants of the optimal number
of children and the spacing of births as family income, mother's education,
and marital status. In the same equation c is the cost of contraception,
which is directly related to money price and indirectly related to availa-
bility and to contraceptive efficiency or knowledge. This cost also has a
psychic component due to joint production (Grossman 1971; Michael 1.973;
Pollack and Wachter 1975): an increase in contraceptive use lowers the—7—
probability of becoming pregnant but may also reduce the gratification
yielded by sexual intercourse. The variable ai gives the direct, indirect,
and psychic costs of obtaining an abortion. The latter cost component
should be higher for Catholics than for non—Catholics. The variable e1
measures the health endowment of the fetus.
Examples of members of the x vector in the birthweight production
function (2) and of the y vector in the prenatal care demand function (3)
are given in Section II. The roles of the uji(J=1.2.3). which are linear
functions of c, a1, and e, are discussed below. In addition to prenatal
care, the birthweight production function contains another endogenous input
(q). which reflects such healthy behaviors as proper diet, appropriate
exercise, and the avoidance of stress. The model includes an unspecified
demand function for healthy behaviors that has the sane arguments as the
demand function for prenatal medical care. Finally, each of the three
equations contains an unspecified random disturbance term.
A reduction in the price of contraception is expected to raise the
probability of giving birth (a2< 0). while an increase in the price of
abortion is expected to raise this probability (a3> 0). The basic force
that generates these predictions is an implicit equation for the probabi-
lity of becoming pregnant. Under the plausible assumption that contracep-
tion and abortion are alternative methods of birth control, a rise in the
price of contraception or a decline in the price of abortion raises this
probability. As these propositions imply, pregnancies to women with low
costs of averting them (low contraceptive costs) may be termed "wanted"
pregnancies.It also follows that a fall in the cost of contraception or—8-
abortion raises the quantity of prenatal care (2 < 0, 73 < 0) and raises
the level of the healthy behavior input. The force at work here is that a
reduction in the cost of averting a pregnancy or a birth lowers the optimal
number of children and raises the optimal amount of resources allocated to
each birth (Becker and Lewis 1973; Willis 1973). This is another sense in
which a reduction in the price of averting a birth raises the level of wan-
tedness.
It is very likely that women whose potential or actual fetuses have
favorable health endowments demand a larger optimal number of children and
are more likely to choose to give birth than women with unfavorable
endowments (a4> 0). Moreover, the coefficients of the endowment in the
demand functions for prenatal care (y4) and the healthy behavior are nega-
tive because of a reallocation of resources away from infant health induced
by a better endowment.3
Given measures of the price of contraception, the price of abortion,
the health endowment of the fetus, and the healthy behavior input, one
could quantify the above effects precisely and also obtain an estimate of
the coefficient of prenatal care in the birthweight production function
($2) that controls for the endowment and healthy behaviors. Since these
variables are not observed or measured imperfectly, this is not possible.
Nevertheless, it still is possible to shed considerable light on their
roles in reproductive outcomes. The basic idea is to include their levels
and effects in the disturbance term in each equation (Uji) and then obtain
estimates of the covariances between disturbance terms across equations.4
To be specific, assume that u(J =1,2,3)has a zero mean, and denote—9-.




a13= a4y4a + a2y2a + a3y3a (5)
023= 844e + 832qc + 33°qa'
(6)
where aj(j =e,c,a)is the variance of variable Jandaqj(J =c,a)is the
covariance between q and j.Itis assumed that e, c, and a are mutually
uncorrelated and that q does not depend on e.(The conclusions reached are
not sensitive to the lack of these relationships.) Recall that a3 and a4
are positive, while 72' Y. 74. 0qc' and °qa are negative. Moreover, 8
and84 are positive since an increase in the healthy behavior input or an
increase in the health endowment of the fetus raises birthweight.
The sign patterns of the covariances identify whether the health
endowment of the fetus, the cost of contraception, or the cost of abortion
is the dominant unmeasured determinant of reproductive outcomes. For
instance, suppose that the prices of abortion and contraception do not vary
(a =a
= = 0qa=0).Then a12 is positive, while a13 and a23 are
negative. That is, an increase in the health endowment raises the proba-
bility of giving birth and birthweight (u11 and U2i increase), while it
lowers the quantity of prenatal care demanded (U3i declines). Now suppose
that there is no variation in the price of abortion or in the health
endowment. Then each covariance is positive. A reduction in the cost of
contraception makes a birth more likely (Ui rises), causes the healthy
behavior input and therefore birthweight to expand (u2i rises), and causes— 10—
thequantity of prenatal care to grow (u3i rises). Finally, if the price
of abortion alone varies, a12 and a13 are negative, whilea23 is positive.
The health endowment model (no variation in c or a) is the oneempha-
sized by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982, 1983a, 1983b, forthcominga, forth-
coming b) and by us in our previous research (Corman, Joyce, and Grossman
1981; Joyce 19B1). It may be termed a model with adverse selection in
input use because women who demand relatively large amounts of prenatal
care have poor endowments. It also is a model with favorable selection in
pregnancy resolution because women with relatively good endowments are more
likely to give birth. The cost of contraception model (no variation in a
or e) and the cost of abortion model (no variation in c or e) reflect
favorable selection in input use because prenatal care and healthy beha-
viors are positively related. The cost of contraception model is charac-
terized by favorable selection in pregnancy resolution because women with
larger optimal values of m and q are more likely to give birth. The
reverse holds in the cost of abortion model.5 A unique sign pattern
emerges in each model, which permits one to identify the relevant one.
Moreover, identification is based solely on the signs ofa12 and 0j3, which
is important because the procedure described below yields direct estimates
of these two parameters.
When all three determinants vary, the sign of a given covariance is
ambiguous. But their sign patterns still identify the dominant factor.6
To summarize, the estimation of the model specified here and the pairwise
covariances between its disturbance terms shed light on the qualitative and
quantitative importance of hard-to-measure determinants of birth outcomes.— 11—
Tobe sure, some caution should be exercised in giving names to
unmeasured variables. For example, the predictions made by the cost of
contraception model are identical to those in a model in which women who
make relatively large investments in their children are more likely to give
birth for whatever reason. Indeed, the concept of 'wantedness," which is
emphasized by demographers and sociologists, is placed in an economic con-
text and 9iven an economic interpretation, by the cost of contraception
model.
Moreover, other economic models can generate the same predictions as a
sociological model of wantedness. For example, suppose that the price of
the healthy behavior input (q1) varies among women. Even if the money
price of this input is the same for everyone, the time price may differ as
a function of wage rates and the inconvenience costs of meal preparation
and exercise. The ability of pregnant women to avoid stressful situations
may depend on the nature of their jobs and family circumstances. Differences
in the knowledge or perception of the health benefits of this input also
generate differences in its 'shadow price." The same effect can be attri-
buted to joint production since the healthy behavior input may be a direct
source of utility (or disutility) as well as an input into infant health.
Hence the shadow price of q as an infant health input depends in part on
the monetary value of its direct marginal utility or disutility, which may
vary among women.7
Let us introduce the shadow price (p) of the healthy behavior input as
an additional unobservable in the birth probability equation (1) and the
prenatal care demand function (3). Clearly1 a reduction in p raises the— 12—
quantityof the healthy behavior input demanded. In addition, assume that
it raises the birth probability, either because the optimal number of
children as well as their optimal health rises or because the probability
of becoming pregnant falls.0 Finally, note that the sign of p In the
demand function for prenatal care is ambiguous. It is negative if m andq
are complements and positive if they are substitutes.
Under these conditions, the price of healthy behavior model (no
variation in a, c, and e) makes the same predictions as the cost of contra-
ception model if m and q are complements and makes the same predictions as
the health endowment model if m and q are substitutes. We do not emphasize
this model because the equation that generates selection pertains to the
probability of giving birth. The cost of contraception and abortion and
the health endowment of the fetus are more proximate determinants of this
probability than the cost of engaging in healthy behaviors. But it should
be kept in mind that our results are open to more than one interpretation.
The empirical relevance of the cost of contraception model is high-
lighted by recent research by Forrest (1988), Forrest and Fordyce (1988),
and Jones et a]. (1988). These studies show that nonuse of effective
contraceptive methods by women aged 15 through 44 is a point of concern in
the United States. Moreover, contraceptive use is much lower and the abor-
tion rate is much higher in the U.S. than in Canada and most Western
European countries. These findings are attributed to the wider availabilty
of contraceptive services and to the higher level of informationconcerning
these services in the countries to which the U.S. was compared.9 It is
plausible that the forces that generate a larger mean shadow price of— 13—
contraceptionin the U.S. also generate substantial differences in this
price among U.S. residents.
Note that it is somewhat of an oversimplification to view induced
abortion as a substitute for conventional contraceptive methods. In part
this is the case, but abortion also is a remedy for contraceptive failure.
It gives parents the option virtually to eliminate uncertainties associated
with the number and spacing of births at a positive price. An analysis of
the determinants of this decision is beyond the scope of this paper. But
persons who find it less difficult (less costly) to correct their mistakes
should be more likely to resort to an abortion in the event of a contracep-
tive failure. To be specific, given the considerable amount of evidence
that education raises productive and allocative efficiency in the market
and in the household (Welch 1970; Grossman 1972; Michael 1972; Rosenzweig
and Schultz 1982a, 1983; Edwards and Grossman 1983; Wozniak 1987), the more
educated may have higher abortion propensities even if they have lower
costs of contraception.
To estimate the three equation model of birth outcomes, we employ pro-
cedures developed by Ileckman (1979). The estimation method not only yields
the covariances (a12 and a13) but also recognizes that the coefficients of
the birthweight production function are biased if the censored nature of
the birth sample is ignored. Thus, it provides an estimate of the prenatal
care coefficient (p2) that potentially controls both for adverse selection
and for favorable selection in input use. This coefficient is biased downward
by adverse selection and biased upward by favorable selection in computations
that ignore these factors.- 14—
Equations(1), (2), and (3) pertain to all pregnant women, but the
last two are observed only for women who give birth. These are women for
whom it10 or u —ajz1. In such a sample, the expected value of birth—
weight or prenatal care is
E(bl xj. in1. i 0) =$1x1+ fl2m1 + E(u2iI uli
—aiz) (1)
E(mI \'i ITj0)='1i+ E(u3i1 u11
—ajz1) (B)
As emphasized by Heckman, if u11 and u21 are correlated, the conditional
mean of u2i in equation (7) is not zero, and the regressors in the equation
are correlated with the disturbance term. Hence, ordinary least squares
estimates of its coefficients are biased. Exactly the same comments apply
to equation (B). As we have already seen, there are good reasons to expect
a12 and 0j3 to be nonzero.
Heckman has shown that unbiased estimates of equations (7)and (8) can
be obtained under the assumption that the joint distributions of u11, U2i
and uli, u31 are bivariate normal densities. His procedure is to fit the
birth probability equation (1) as a probit function and to compute the
inverse of Mill's ratio (A) for each woman who gives birth:
=f(Q)/F(Qi). (9)
Here Q =alzi/ajand f and F are, respectively, the density and distribu-
tion functions for a standard normal variable. The inverse of Mill's ratio
is then inserted as a regressor in equations (1) and (B) which, after




Note that the coefficients of Ai in (10) and (11) estimate a12 and a13,
respectively, up to a positive scale factor (1/a1).10
One conceptual issue that arises in the context of the estimation of
the model pertains to the potential endogeneity of prenatal care in the
birthweight production function. It is clear that m1 and the disturbance
term (u21) in the birthweight production function (2) are correlated if u2
is correlated with the disturbance term (uai) in the demand function for
prenatal care (3). From equation (6), a23 is nonzero unless
—A474ae =3T2aqc43Y3aqa.Although the disturbance terms in (2) and (3)
undoubtedly are correlated, the disturbance terms in (10) and (11) are less
likely to be correlated because both equations include the inverse of
Mill's ratio (Ai) as a regressor. Oifferences in A1 among women who give
birth reflect differences in the health endowment of the fetus and the
costs of contraception and abortion. Since these factors generate the
correlation between disturbance terms, the biases that they introduce are
reduced when A1 is employed in the equation.
More formally, weighted (to correct for heteroskedacticity) ordinary
least squares estimation of the birthweight production function is
appropriate when a sin9le factor generates the three covariances among the
disturbance terms. For example, suppose that only the health endowment
varies. Then each of the three pairwise correlation coefficients (Ph)
equals one in absolute value, and the coefficient of A1 in the estimated— 16—
birthweightequation (8474°e) differs from the coefficient of the health
endowment (e) in the structural birthweight equation (84) only by a posi-
tive scale factor (a4ae). Now suppose that cost of contraception model
fully described the data. Then P1rP23°qc/°c and p13=1. Once again, the
coefficient of A1 in the birthweight production function (8aa2aqc/ac) dif-
fers from the coefficient of the healthy behavior input (q) In the struc-
tural equation ($)onlyby a positive scale factor (a2aqc/ac). When more
than one factor varies, two—stage least squares estimation of the produc-
tion function with prenatal care treated as an endogenous variable may be
appropriate. We examine this proposition by using the two-stage least
squares probit method for simultaneous equations models with selectivity
developed by Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1980) and the Wu—Hausman endogeneity
test (Wu 1973; Hausman 1978).
II. Data and Estimation
Data on births and abortions are from NewYorkCity vital statistics in
1984. In that year there were approximately 105,000 singleton live births
and 89,000 induced abortion to New York City residents. Our analysis is
based on randomly chosen subsamples of the combined population of births
and induced abortions.12 We examined 11,591 pregnancies to white,
non—Hispanic women twenty years and older and 11,016 pregnancies to black,
non-Hispanic women of the same age.13 We excluded adolescents in order to
minimize problems of endogeneity. This issue is discussed in greater
detail below.
Our analysis is made possible because nany of the parental charac—— 17—
ter-isticsreported on the birth certificates are also reported on the
induced termination records. Thus, by concatenating the data sets we were
able to specify an equation predicting the probability of giving birth,
given a woman was pregnant. A description of the variables is provided in
Table 1. The means and proportions within each subsample are presented in
Table 2.
Data from the abortion and birth certificates were augmented with 1980
census data which had been aggregated from the census tract to the health
area level. The health area is the smallest geographical area identified
on the birth and abortion certificates. New York City is divided into 352
health areas. The average health area contains between 15,000 and 25,0.00
residents. The census data enabled us to calculate the percentage of per-
sons below the poverty level in each health area by race.
The vital statistics were also augmented with variables that measure
the availability of various reproductive health services. Combining data
from the Alan Guttmacher Institute and the New York City Department of
Health, we knew the number of family planning clinics, abortion providers.
and prenatal clinics by health area in 1983. These availability measures
were divided by the number of women 15 to 44 in a health area in 1980. The
denominators were from the 1980 census. A fourth availability measure was
a dichotomous variable that equaled one if the women lived in a health
district in which was located a health center operated by the Federal
Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC).14 WIC
had thirteen locations in New York City in 1983 where women could enroll
and receive food coupons. Nine of these centers also housed maternal and— 18—
TableI
Description of Variables
Birthweight The weight of an infant in grams
Prenatal care delay The number of months from when a woman conceived
until she made her first prenatal care visit
Induced abortions The number of previous induced abortions
Spontaneous abortions The number of previous spontaneous abortions
(including fetal deaths)
Late spontaneous abortionsThe number of previous spontaneous abortions that
occurred after the 19th week of gestation
Parity Number of previous life births
Age 35 to 39 A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
woman is 35 to 39 years of age
Age 40 and over A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
woman is 40 years or older
Education <9 A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
woman completed less than nine years of schooling
Education =12 A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
woman completed twelve years of schooling
Education >12 A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
woman completed more than twelve years of schooling
Illegitimacy A dichotomous variable that equals one if a woman
is not married
Medicaid A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
abortion or birth was financed by Medicaid
Self-financed A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
abortion or birth was self-financed
Male A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
infant is male
Private service A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
woman's private physician delivered the birth— 19—
Table1 (continued)
Narcotics A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
pregnancy was complicated by narcotics
Tobacco A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
pregnancy was complicated by smoking
Alcohol A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
pregnancy was complicated by alcohol
Family planning clinic The number of family planning clinics per 10,000
women 15 to 44 in a health area
Abortion providers The number of abortion providers per 10,000
women 15 to 44 in a health area
Prenatal care clinics The number of prenatal care clinics per 10,000
women 15 to 44 in a health area
WIC center A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
woman resided in a health area district that
contained an office for the Supplemental
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children
Poverty The race— and ethnic-specific percentage of people
below the poverty level in 1980 in a health area;
measure for whites includes both white Hispanics
and white non-Hispanics; similar comment applies
to measure for blacks
Lambda The inverse Mill's ratio which is a monotonically
decreasing function of the probability of
giving birth given that a woman is pregnant— 20—
Table2
Means by Pregnancy Outcome For White and Black Women Twenty Years and Older
Whites Blacks______ BirthsAbortions BirthsAbortions
Birthweight 3,381 ———
fllegitimacy .08 .69 .55
——-
.76
Education <9 .02 .02
Education =12 .44 .43
.01
Education >12 .49 .45
Male .50 —-—
.31 .28
Age 35 to 39 .12 .10 .06
-—-





Private service .86 .69
.32




Parity .86 .76 1.26
Tota' induced abortions .22 1.04 .50
1.52
Late induced abortions .01 ———
1.30
Total spontaneous abortions ii .12
.01 -——












Famfly planning clinics .74 .94
Prenatal care clinics .67 .70
1.36













infantcare (M and I) projects. They provide prenatal and obstetrical care
to poor women under the 1963 amendment to Title V of the Social Security
Act.
The weight of a child at birth is our indicator of infant health
((equation (2)]. The literature linking birthweight to infant mortality
and childhood morbidity is voluminous (Institute of Medicine 1965).
Prenatal care Is measured by the number of months a woman delays before
seeking medical care for her pregnancy (equation 3). Women who received no
care are assumed to have delayed 10 months. This prenatal care measure
should be negatively related to birthweight. The birth probability
equation has a dichotomous dependent variable: one if the women gives
birth, zero if she aborts [(equation (1)].
The specification of the birthweight production function is based on
the structural relationship between medical and biological inputs and the
birth outcome. Thus, in addition to prenatal care, we include the
newborn's sex, dichotomous variables for older women and marital status.
the number of previous live births as well as the number of previous late
spontaneous abortions. The latter two inputs may control for, in part, a
woman's reproductive capability. To measure the quality of care we include
an indication of whether the child was delivered by the patient's private
physician or whether the delivery was performed by a general service physi-
cian. Following Grossman (1972), mother's education is used to control for
efficiency in household production. Finally, we employ three dichotomous
variables that indicate whether the pregnancy was complicated by alcohol,
drugs, or tobacco.- 22—
Wetreat the prenatal care demand equation (equation 3) and birth pro-
bability equation as reduced forms. In addition to the mother's charac-
teristics such as age, marital status, and obstetric history, we included
the method of finance as well as the areal measures of reproductive health
services and the race—specific poverty rate. The method of finance has
three categories: Medicaid, other third party (private health insurance or
health maintenance organization), or self—payJ5
With respect to prenatal care, we expect women on Medicaid and women
who paid for the birth themselves to delay the initiation of prenatal care
longer than women whose care is financed by private health insurance.
Women applying for Medicaid for the first time may experience delays in
processing their applications. Moreover, all Medicaid recipients may face
greater search costs since many providers do not accept Medicaid due to the
level of reimbursement. In the birth probability equation, however, it is
unclear a priori whether Medicaid recipients are more likely to abort than
non-Medicaid recipients. New York State finances abortions for Medicaid
eligible women, and thus the out—of—pocket costs are zero. Yet, Medicaid
status clearly measures poverty. If the opportunity costs of giving birth
are lower for poor than nonpoor women, then Medicaid status could be posi-
tively related to the probability of giving birth.
As discussed in Section I, we apply Heckman's two-step procedure to
correct for biases due to self—selection. Following Lee, Trost and Maddala
(1980) we also estimate a model in which prenatal care is treated as an
endogenous input in the birthweight equation. Both models require that we
impose restrictions in order to achieve identification. As mentioned— 23—
above,the birthweight equation excludes measures of income and availabi-
lity. At the same time it includes the sex of the child and whether the
birth was complicated by alcohol, narcotics, or tobacco, and whether the
birth was delivered by a private physician. Thus, the birthweight equation
easily meets the rank and order conditions for indentification.
Identification of the prenatal care demand function is more problema-
tic. Identification can be achieved via the nonlinear relationship between
the inverse of Mill's ratio (A) and the regressors in the birth probability
equation. In other words, even if the vector in equation (1) and the
vector y1 in equation (3) contain the same set of variables, the equations
are still identified. Nevertheless, the model is on firmer grounds if
there are unique determinants of each equation.
We assume that the availability of family planning clinics, the availa-
bility of abortion providers, and the number of previous induced abortions
have no impact on the demand for prenatal care. This is most defensible
in a model in which variations in the health endowment are small, so that
differences in the monetary and psychic costs of contraception and abortion
are fully captured by variations in A. Moreover, unlike spontaneous abor-
tions, there is little evidence that links induced abortions to subsequent
reproductive difficulties (Hogue. Cates, and Tietze 1982). We include
parity in the prenatal care demand equation but exclude it from the birth
probability equation because the left-hand side of the latter equation is
mechanically related to parity.16 We include parity in the prenatal care
demand function because it proxies experience with pregnancy and birth. In
addition, parity and the number of late spontaneous abortions may control,— 24—
inpart, for a woman's health endowment. Finally, the availability of pre-
natal care clinics and WIC centers are obvious determinants of the receipt
of early prenatal care but much less closely related to optimal family size
and the decision to give birth.17
Although the birth probability function is termed a reduced form
equation, certain regressors in it are potentially endogenous. Among
teenagers, for instance, education may determine the probability of
aborting, but the years of schooling completed is clearly related to the
time spent pregnant (Hofferth 1987). A similar issue occurs between
Medicaid status and pregnancy resolution. Among unmarried, nulliparous
adolescents, giving birth is a precondition for receiving continued support
from Medicaid and additional support from welfare. Marital status is a
third example. Between 1980 and 1981, 28 percent of all white first births
to adolescents were conceived premaritally, but born inside of marriage
(O'Connell and Rogers 1984). In short, the decision to give birth, espe-
cially among adolescents, may be determined simultaneously with the deci-
sion to complete school, apply for Medicaid, or get married (Leibowitz,
Eisen, and Chow 1986; Joyce 1988). Therefore, to minimize these problems
we estimate the model for women twenty years of age or more since the endo-
geneity of marital status, Medicaid, and education should be less relevant
for these women.
We treat prenatal medical care as the only endogenous variable in the
birthweight production function, yet other variables in this equation could
be viewed in a similar manner. These include mother's age, parity, and
cigarette smoking, all of which are treated as endogenous by Rosenzweig and— 25—
Schultz(1982, 1983b, forthcoming a, forthcomingb) in the estimation of
birthweight production functions in the 1967—69 and 1980 U.S. National
Natality Followback Surveys. We examine the endogeneity of prenatal care
alone in the production function because we have a well—specified equation
for the demand for this input. Moreover, both the birthweight production
function and the prenatal care demand function must be estimated to ascer-
tain whether the cost of contraception, the cost of abortion, or the health
endowment of the fetus is the dominant unmeasured determinant of reproduc-
tive outcomes. The estimation of other equations is not essential in
accomplishing this goal. Since prenatal care is the dependent variable in
the demand function, it is logical to consider its endogeneity in the pro-
duction function.
We do not deny the validity of Rosenzweig and Schultz's methodology and
the value of their contribution. We wish to emphasize, however, that our
objective is different from theirs. We incorporate the choice—based nature
of micro vital records into the estimation of birthweight production func-
tions, while they focus solely on live births. In contrast, their aim is to
treat a variety of variables as endogenous. In addition to the different
objectives of the studies, we do not endogenize variables other than prena-
tal care because Rosenzweig and Schultz use national samples. Thus, many
more instrumental variables are available to them.'8 Moreover, the two—
stage least squares estimates on which they focus are not obtained at zero
cost. One of their main instrumental variables is mother's schooling which
may be determined simultaneously with family size, particularly since they
do not exclude teenagers. In addition, Rosenzweig and Schultz omit- 26—
mother'sschooling from the birthweight production function. Although they
present statistical evidence in support of this exclusion (Rosenzweig and
Schultz 1981). it is not consistent with the theoretical and empirical
literature on the productive efficiency of education in nonmarket produc-
tion that we have cited.
Finally, we choose a linear functional form because the true rela-
tionship between birthweight and infant or childhood health is not known.
The linear form has the virtue of simplicity. The use of a linear func-
tional form rules out an investigation of the optimal input mix (the com-
bination of inputs that minimize the cost of producing a given level of
infant health), but this is not the focus of our empirical research.
Moreover, we include only one measured endogenous input.
III. Results
Empirical estimates of the birth probability equation and prenatal
care demand equations are presented in Table 3. The birth probability
equation is estimated by maximum likelihood probit. Two estimates of the
prenatal care demand equation are shown. The first is estimated by ordinary
least squares (OLS) without correcting for selection. The second employs the
inverse of Mill's ratio as a regressor and adjusts the standard errors as
suggested by Heckman (1979). Table 4 presents three estimates of the birth—
weight production function. The first equation is obtained by OLS with no
attempt to correct for selection or endogeneity. The second specification
corrects for selection but treats prenatal care as exogenous. The third uses
the two—stage least squares (TSLS) procedure outlined by Lee, Maddala, Trost— 27
Table 3
Birth Probability and Prenatal Care (Months of Oelay) Demand for
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*Corrected forselection.





































































































































































F-statistic 65.04 78.98 38.50 36.07
Chi—squared 6130
A-squared .092 .093
Observations 11.569 4924 4924
2238.3
.131 .131
1361 7361 11016— 28 —
Table4
Birthweight Production Functions For White and Black Wo.en Twenty Years and alder
Whites Blacks
OLS 015* TSLS 015 OLS* TSLS
Intercept 3236.840 3231.580 3304.470 3154.790 3126.603253.200
(86.05) (85.38) (42.42) (93.39) (188.39) (31.58)
Schooling 9 142.706 135.660 142.112 51.417 61.109 61.917
(2.78) (2.63) (2.73) (1.10) (1.42) (1.27)
Schooling a12 47.513 13.615 31.072 60.697 37.820 28.610
(1.64) (1.50) (.99) (2.60) (1.52) (1.09)
Schooling ,.12 71.021 57.472 50.819 81.098 68.990 45.821
(2.41) (2.28) (1.54) (3.16) (2.54) (1.48)
Age 35 to 39 -32.386 -33.760 —36.418 21.205 19.271 8.312
(—1.72)(—1.79) (—1.92) (.66) (.61) (.25)
Age 40 to 44 14.816 5.282 -.346 -61.360 -76.584 -85.518
(.33)(.12) (—.01) (—.93) (—1.15) (—1.25)
Late spontaneous abortions —94.597 —94.864-96.308 -58.265-53.575 -55.618
(—1.39) (—1.40)(—1.42) (—1.22) (—1.12) (—1.13)
Illegitimate —98.187-139.368 —111.093 —66.120 -99.938 -82.897
(—4.04)(—3.22)(—2.232) (—3.64) (—4.50) (—3.34)
Parity 25.26125.215 28.069 8.324 6.531 12.306
(5.11) (5.09) (4.95) (1.30) (1.01) (1.61)
Privateservice 34.09434.201 32.825 24.975 20.520 22.515
(1.70)(1.71) (1.66) (1.22) (1.00) (1.02)
Male 120.366 120.226119.652 114.054114.995 114.79
(10.10) (10.09)(10.02) (6.79) (5.86) (6.64)
Tobacco -44.515 -44.341 -42.416 —188.901 -166.753-187.156
(—.90)(-.89) (-.85) (—5.14) (-5.09) (—4.95)
Alcohol 248.803 249.147253.288 47.816 49.387 55.985
(3.91)(3.94) (3.98) (.48) (.50) (.55)
Narcotics -356.186 —361.728 -362.335 —325.128 -334.900—352.625
(—3.86) (—3.91)(—3.91) (—4.52)(—4.66) (—4.79)
Prenatal care delay -4.472—4.384—23.145 -12.615-12.380 -37.428
(—1.22)(—1.20)(—1.35) (—3.60)(—3.54) (—1 .97)
Lambda 36.149 33.192 85.606 74.022
(1.15) (1.05) (2.51) (2.16)
F—statistic 16.29 15.27 14.38 13.90
Wu—test F*** 2.30 2.03
R-squared .030 .030 .039 .041
Observations 7352 7362 7362 4924 4924 4924
* Corrected for selection.
** Prenatal care delay is endogenous.
*** The critical F(1) at the 5 percent level is 3.84.- 29-
(1980) tocorrect for the endogeneity of prenatal care as well as for selec-
tivity.
Regardless of race, legitimacy status, the number of previous induced
abortions, the number of previous spontaneous abortions, and Medicaid eli-
gibility are statistically significant predictors of the probability of
giving birth.In particular, women who are not married, and women who have
had at least one induced abortion prior to the current pregnancy are less
likely to give birth. Women who are eligible for Medicaid and women who
have involuntarily lost a previous pregnancy are more likely to give birth.
As indicated in Section II, the sign of the Medicaid effect is ambiguous
on a priori grounds. Therefore, the last result is notable because it
duplicates the one found in a recent study of adolescents by Leibowitz,
Eisen, and Chow (1986). They reported that unmarried teenagers who were
eligible for Medicaid financing of an abortion or a delivery were more
likely to keep their babies in a sample of California residents in the
period 1972-74.
Among blacks, there appears to be a linear relationship between years
of completed schooling and the likelihood of an abortion. However, among
whites, the relationship is more u-shaped. White pregnant women with be-
tween nine and eleven years of schooling are the most likely to give birth.
Following national aggregates, older pregnant women of both races have a
greater probability of terminating the current pregnancy than women twenty
to thirty-four years of age (Henshaw et al. 1985).
With regard to the areal characteristics, white women living in neigh-
borhoods of relative poverty have a greater than average propensity to- 30-
abort.Poverty has no impact on pregnancy resolution among blacks. The
availability of abortion providers increases the probability of terminating
a pregnancy for white women, but it has the opposite effect for black
women.
In discussing the birthweight production functions and prenatal care
demandfunctions,we focus on the role of sample selection bias and on the
effect of prenatal care on birthweight. There is strong evidence of selec-
tivity bias in the birthweight production function and prenatal demand equation
among blacks. There is no evidence of such bias among whites. For blacks, the
results suggest that the unobserved factors which raise the probability of
giving birth are positively correlated with the unobserved factors that
decrease delay in the initiation of prenatal care and increase birthweight.
For black women the sign patterns among the residual covariances are
consistent with a model that emphasizes the cost of contraceptive. In par-
ticular, black women for whom the shadow price of contraception is relati-
vely high are more likely to experience an unintended pregnancy and more
likely to carry the pregnancy to term than their counterparts who face a
lower shadow price and whose pregnancies were more likely to have been
planned. The latter group should consume more prenatal care (delay less)
and invest in other healthy behaviors that improve birthweight.
One explanation for the racial differences with respect to selectivity
bias is that the shadow price of contraception is greater for blacks than
it is for whites. Further, the shadow price is apt to vary more among
blacks than it does among whites. Racial differences in contraceptive use
and abortion are consistent with this interpretation (Pratt et al. 1984;— 31—
Henshawet al. 1985; Stephen, Rindfuss, and Bean 1986).
Failure to correct for self—selection can yield biased estimates of the
health technology. For example, the effect of illegitimacy rises by 50
percent in absolute value when lambda is included in the birthweight
equation for blacks. Since unmarried women are more likely to abort, those
who do not abort may have lower contraceptive costs. As a result, the
coefficient on illegitimacy is understated if lambda is omitted. It should
also be noted that the impact of post—secondary education falls and the
incremental benefit of a high school diploma becomes statistically insigni-
ficant when selectivity bias is corrected.
Our results for blacks indicate that women who aborted would have given
birth to lighter infants if they had selected the birth option and if they
had had the same mean values of the observed variables in the birthweight
equation as women who actually gave birth. One way to gauge the magnitude
of the effect is to compare it to that of an observed risk factor for birth
outcomes. Among blacks, complication due to smoking reduce birthweight by
187 grams or by 5.8 percent relative to a mean of 3,184 for pregnancies not
complicated Dy smoking.19 On the other hand, potential mean birthweight in
the abortion sample falls short of birthweight in the birth sample by 116
grams due to unobserved inputs alone.20 This amounts to a differential of 3.7
percent relative to the observed mean of 3,173 for all black women in the birth
sample. Thus, the impact of unobserved healthy behaviors is almost two-thirds
as large in absolute value as the effect of smoking. Finally, if we allow for
differences in both observed and unobserved characteristics, the potential mean
birthweight of women who aborted would have 140 grams less than the observed— 32—
meanbirthweight.
As expected the OLS coefficients of prenatal care delay are negative.
That is, the longer a woman delays between conception and her first prena-
tal care visit, the lighter the infant at birth. In the case of whites,
each month of delay reduces birthweight by 4.4 grams, but the coefficient is
not significant at the 5 percent level on a one—tailed test. The figure for
blacks is 12.4, which is significant at the 5 percent level. The results for
whites are almost identical to the OLS estimates obtained by Rosenzweig and
Schultz (forthcoming a) with data on births to women of all races from the 1980
U.S. National Natality Followback Survey. However, Rosenzweig and Schultz
emphasize the TSLS estimates which reveal that a month's delay in the ini-
tiation of prenatal care decreases birthweight by 91 grams, a twenty-fold
increase over the estimates they obtain by OLS.
The results of treating prenatal care as an endogenous input are pre-
sented in Table 4. The TSLS estimate for blacks is three times greater
than the corfficient obtained by OLS; the TSLS estimate remains statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent level. For whites the coefficient of prena-
tal care increases six—fold when estimated by TSLS but the null hypothesis of
no effect cannot be rejected. Although the direction of the change between the
OLS and TSLS estimates is similar to that obtained by Rosenzweig and Schultz,
the magnitude of the change is substantially less. Moreover, we find no
empirical evidence that prenatal care should be treated as endogenous.2'
Following Heckman (1980) and later Nakamura and Hakamura (1981), we applied a
Wu test in which the residuals from the equation predicting prenatal care
corrected for selection were entered as a right—hand—side regressor in the— 33—
birthweightequation. We could not reject the null hypothesis of no correla-
tion in either the white or black specifications at the 5 percent level. The
relevant F statistics are presented in Table 4.
A comparison of our results with those of Rosenzweig and Schultz, however,
is limited for several reasons. First, our data is restricted to New York City
whereas the National Natality Survey samples women from across the country.
Furthermore, we were able to estimate a race—specific model which proved to be
important. Third, the National Survey excludes out-of—wedlock births. Over 57
percent of all births to black women in the United States and over 70 percent
in New York are born out—of-wedlock (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1986). Fourth,
given our focus on self—selection, we treated only prenatal care as an endoge-
nous input whereas Rosenzweig and Schultz included age, parity and smoking as
endogenous.22 Fifth, our specification of the birthweight equation production
function included additional inputs such as education, the sex of the newborn,
and a measure of the quality of care. In regressions not shown, the omission
of education tended to raise the effect of early prenatal care on birthweight.
Finally, if the inclusion of lambda controls in part for variations in the
endowment as well as the consumption of other endogenous inputs (see Section
I), then the need for TSLS may be attenuated.
IV. Conclusion
Recent attempts to obtain structural estimates of the infant health
technology have used TSLS to control for adverse selection in input use. In
this paper we have presented a model in which the decision to give birth among
pregnant women allows for a more general form of self-selection. Because of/
— 34-
thewidespread availability and use of abortion in New York City, women who
choose to give birth bring to their pregnancies a set of unobserved factors or
behaviors that are associated with the increased consumption of prenatal care
and increased birthweight.
We found selection to be race—specific. Only among black women is the
decision to give birth correlated with healthy behavior and improved birth
outcomes. The result is consistent with the interpretation that the mean
shadow price of contraception and the variance in this price are greater for
blacks than for whites. This suggests that in areas where abortion availabi-
lity is limited, holding the price of contraception constant, theselection
process encouraged by abortion will be muted. Evidence for thatlatter has
been reported by Corman, Joyce, and Grossman (1987) and Joyce (1987) with
county-level data.
In sum, the findings presented here should be considered preliminary.
Although they highlight the relationship between pregnancy resolution and
the infant health technology, much more work is needed. First, the model
should be tested on national data in which variations in the shadow price
of abortion are likely to be greater. Second, better data is needed on why
women abort. Rapid advances in fetal diagnoses and the increased spread of
perinatal AIDS will tend to encourage more selective abortion. Such trends
will emphasize a model in which the health endowment of the women becomes a
more important factor in the resolution of pregnancies as well as the inci-
dence of congenital abnormalities among newborns. And finally, the results
presented here suggest that important gains in our understanding of Dirth
outcomes and prenatal behavior could come from a model that allows the— 35—
informationencapsuled in pregnancy intentions as well as pregnancy resolu—
tions to impact on infant health. This study represents a first step in
that direction.F—i
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1To control for adverse selection caused by health heterogeneity
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982, i983a, 1983b, forthcoming a, forthcoming 0);
Corman, Joyce, and Grossman (1987); and Joyce (1987) use local area prices,
parents' income, and parents' education as instrumental variables. If,
however, the source of bias is due to omitted endogenous inputs such as
nutrition, exercise, and the avoidance of stress, the last two instrumentsmay be inappropriate.
2Leibowitz, Eisen, and Chow (1986) and Joyce (1988) study the decision
to abort a pregnancy in an economic context. But they do not incorporate
this decision into a larger scale model of the optimal number and quality
of children and the choice of contraceptive techniques. Moreover, they do
not use the information conveyed by the decision to abort or give birth to
estimate infant health production functions.
3An increase in the endowment is equivalent to an increase in real
income. Provided all commodities in the utility function are superior,
their optimal values rise. We use the tern "very likely" in the text
because we do not fully take account of induced substitution between the
optimal number of children and their quality (health) that occurs in the
model developed by Becker and Lewis (1973).
4To the extent that there are measured components of the price of
contraception, such as mother's education or the availability of family
planning clinics, these components are now included in the x.j vector.
Similar comments apply to the other variables.
5Note that adverse or favorable selection in pregnancy resolution is
determined by the sign of correlation between the disturbance term in the
birth probability equation and the disturbance term in the birthweight
equation. Adverse or favorable selection in input use is determined by the
sign of the correlation between the disturbance tern in the birthweight
equation and the disturbance term in the prenatal care equation. Although
the procedure described below does not yield an estimate of a23, its signF—3
can be inferred from the signs of a12 and a13 in a single factor model.
With more than one factor, the sign of a23 can be inferred by placing
reasonable restrictions on the magnitudes of certain parameters. For
example, suppose that e and a vary while c does not. In addition, suppose
that a12 is positive. The necessary condition for a23 to be negative
(which is plausible since °13 must be negative) is A474° c _$373Cqa
When $=$ and74= y3, this is satisfied provided a 0qa•
6The above statement is subject to one modification. The case in which
the effects of the determinants exactly offset each other (a12 =013=
= 0)cannot be distinguished from one in which each effect taken alone
is zero.
7This can be illustrated in the context of a simple model in which the
following utility function is maximized:
U =U(b(m,q),q, n, s].
Here n is the number of births and s is adult consumption. Let p* be the
money price of q, let the money prices of m and s each equal one dollar,
and let a subscript denote a partial derivative. First-order conditions






wheretisthe marginal utility of income. Hence
(bq/bm)
[p* -(Uq/JA)]/fl.
The last equation equates the ratio of marginal products in the productionF—4
of birthweight to the input price ratio. According to this equation, the
price of input q is p* —(Uq/.t).Clearly, this price is endogenous because
Uq/P depends on the arguments in the utility function. Exogenous deter-
minants of this variable enter the birth probability and prenatal care





Then the ratio of $2j to •4i serves as an unobservable in birth outcomes.
8Based on the notation in note 7, a reduction in the price of an infant
health input could reduce the quantity of b or n demanded but not both.
This is due to induced substitution between the two variables generated by
the endogeneity of their shadow prices (Becker and Lewis 1973; Willis
1973). Of course, both b and n could rise as the price of an infant health
input falls. In our context b is unlikely to fall unless q and m are very
good substitutes, and this implausible result is ruled out. Even if n
falls with p, the probability of giving birth should rise. This is because
some of the unobserved factors that cause p to vary are also likely to
cause the efficiency and psychic cost of contraception to vary.
9To be specific, contraceptives are considered to be preventive care in
the U.S. and are not covered by most health insurance policies. A second
factor is the structure of the U.S. health care system. In other countries
women go to one doctor, usually a family practitioner, for all their medi-
cal needs. In the U.S. specialists dominate. Women must go to a gynecolo-
gist for birth control and have the responsibility for finding a provider.
A third factor is that family planning clinics are widely used in otherF-.5
countries, but in the U.S. they have the stigma of being primarily directed
at poor women. Finally, the amount of contraceptive information provided
by schools, radio, television, newspapers, and magazines is more limited in
the U.S.
10The two step procedure just described yields consistent, although
inefficient, estimates. Efficient estimates can be obtained by maximum
likelihood procedures in which the three equations are estimated simulta-
neously, and the residual covariances (a12 and a13) are obtained directly.
The maximum likelihood estimates are not presented in Section III because
they were almost identical to the two step estimates with an exogenous pre-
natal care measure. When prenatal care is treated as endogenous (see
below), the likelihood function is too complicated to pursue estimation
methods other than the two—stage least squares probit method for simulta-
neous equations models with selectivity developed by Lee, Maddala, and
Trost (1980). For the same reason, we avoid a bivariate probit model with
sample selection in which continuous birthweight is replaced by a dichoto-
mous indicator of low birthweight (less than 2,500 grams). In particular,
estimation of this model is not feasible when prenatal care is endogenous.
t1There were several reasons for choosing New York City. First, only 12
states in the U.S. maintain detailed information on induced abortions as
part of their vital registration system (Griner—Powell 1986). Second, the
large number of minorities in New York City permitted a race—specific ana-
lysis. Third, New York City birth and induced termination certificates
contain items that are not recorded in other states ——specifically,how
the birth and abortion were financed, whether the procedure was performedF—B
by the patient's private physician, and whether the pregnancy wascompli-
cated by alcohol, drugs, and tobacco.
t2We do not include women whose pregnancieswere terminated by spon-
taneous abortion. Early spontaneous abortions are poorly reported. The
New York City Department of Health reported 4,960 spontaneous abortions in
1984. This represented less than 4.4 percent of all live births. Yet,
data from the National Survey of Family growth indicate that the ratio of
spontaneous abortions to live births is greater than .21 (Pratt et al. 1.984).
13Our analysis is race-specific because there are substantialdifferen-
ces in birth outcomes, prenatal behavior, and abortion rates between whites
and blacks (Henshaw et al. 1985; Corman, Joyce, and Grossman 1987). We
exclude Hispanics in order to focus on white and black differences and to
make our results more comparable to previously published work. Moreover,
it has been argued recently that Hispanics should not be lumped together
because differences in medical care utilization, birth outcomes, and abor-
tions among, for example, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Cubans are of a non-
trivial magnitude (Williams, Binkin, and Clingman 1986; Schur, Bernstein,
and Berk 1981; Joyce 1988). We hope to explore these differences in sub-
sequent research.
14lhere are 30 health districts in New York City. Each contains
approximately 10 health areas,
151n the birth probability equation the method of finance is reduced to
two categories, Medicaid and all others. The self-pay category is dif-
ficult to interpret in this equation because third—party coverage of abor—F—7
tions isnotcommon. Among women who give birth, however, third party
coverage more accurately reflects a well-insured individual.
t6That is, a woman gives birth if her optimal number of children is less
than or equal to parity plus one. Both the optimal number of children and
parity (which for a given family size measures the timing and spacing of
births) are governed by command over resources, prices, efficiency, tastes,
marital status, and mother's age.
t7Our results were not sensitive to these identification restrictions.
18Por instance, the price of cigarettes varies considerably among states
due primarily to differences in state excise tax rates on cigarettes. Our
cigarette measure also is difficult to endogenize because it is dichotomous
and pertains to pregnancies complicated by smoking rather than to the quan-
tity smoked while pregnant. Both these characteristics also apply to the
alcohol and narcotics variables, while the indicator of the quality of
medical care (delivery by the woman1s private physician) is dichotomous.
19Although our measure of cigarette smoking is a dichotomous indicator,
the 187 gram differential is almost identical to that estimated by
Rosenzweig and Schultz (forthcoming a) in the 1980 National Natality
Survey.
20Based on equations (10) and (11) in the text. mean birthweight in the
birth sample (bb), potential mean birthweight for women who abort (baLe and














Here Xb. Xazand are the means of the determinants of birthweight
and prenatal care in each sample, Ab is the mean of the inverse of Mill's
ratio in the birth sample and is the mean of the inverse of Mill's
ratio, defined as —f(Q1)/[1—F(Q)], in the abortion sample. Thus, the mean
birthweight difference between those who gave birth and those who aborted




The last term in this equation is positive given a12 > 0. It also represents
the difference in birthweight due to unobserved factors. The first two terms
to the right of the equal sign tapture the differences due to observed charac-
teristics.It should be noted that some of the variables in the Xb vector
were not observed for women who aborted. Thus, to calculate the mean poten-
tial birthweight of women who aborted we assumed that the proportion of women
who used tobacco, drugs and alcohol as well as the proportion male infants and
the proportion of women served by private physicians were the same between the
two samples. To test the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, we
re—estimated the model excluding these five variables from the birthweight
equation. The difference between the observed mean and the potential mean
birthweight was not altered appreciably.
21The reader is reminded that this result is specific to a model which
controls for self selection into the birth sample.
22y0 make our results more comparable to those of Rosenzweig and SchultzF—9
we excluded parity, age and legitimacy status from the demand for prenatal
care. The omission had negligible effect on the TSLS estimates.R-1
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